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Abstract 
Using a new trades and quotes dataset, we study European corporate bonds. In this OTC 
market, Euro denominated bonds trade on average 4 times a day and Sterling bonds 1.5 times 
a day. Spreads increase with maturity, default risk and dealers’ market power. For a €100 
bond price, in 2005, effective spreads ranged from 12 cents for small trades to 8 cents for 
large ones. For Sterling bonds, effective spreads ranged from 28 to 15 pence. Greater 
competition and liquidity and tighter spreads in the Euro market reflect participation by 
investors and banks from many countries. Trades have significant information content, 
especially for bonds with low ratings. It takes at least five trading days for the information 
content of a trade to be fully impounded in market pricing, reflecting lack of post trade 
transparency.  
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Bonds play a very important role in the financing of our economies. In the US the 
capitalization of the bond market is roughly the same as that of the stock market. In Europe 
the former is larger than the latter. Hence, the liquidity of the bond market and its 
informational efficiency are key determinants of the financing of governments and firms. 
Several empirical studies offer interesting evidence about the government bond market (see 
e.g., Fleming & Remolona, 1999). It differs markedly from the corporate bond market, 
however. The Treasury market involves one powerful issuer, repeatedly tapping the market, 
for large and rather standardized issues. The corporate bond market involves a large number 
of diverse issuers, some rather small, infrequently tapping the market, often for non-standard 
bonds. These features of the corporate bond market impact its liquidity. In this paper, we 
focus on the secondary market for corporate bonds in Europe. Our goal is to understand the 
workings of this market and investigate its efficiency. Does it convey adequate information to 
economic agents? Is it liquid enough to avoid excessive cost of funds for issuing firms? 
 
Several empirical studies have recently shed interesting light on the microstructure of the US 
corporate bond market (Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003), 
Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007), Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007), Bessembinder, 
Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006)). i Their estimates of the bid-ask spread tend to be larger 
than estimates obtained from the stock market.ii This is surprising, since bonds are less risky 
than stocks, and spreads increase with risk. This suggests that other characteristics of the 
microstructure of bond markets, such as transparency or competition, may be at play. The 
European corporate bond market differs from the US market regarding these variables. Hence, 
it offers an interesting opportunity to offer additional insights on bond markets, 
complementing those generated by studies of the US market.  
 
First consider transparency. In the US, in 2002, regulation TRACE imposed post-trade 
transparency.iii Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) estimate that this increase in 
transparency reduced the bid-ask spread by about 5 to 10 cents (for a bond price of $100.) 
Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) compare spreads between bonds for which TRACE 
implied transparency and bonds for which it did not. They find that post-trade transparency 
induced a drop in spreads ranging between 0 and 55 cents. Bessembinder, Maxwell and 
Venkataraman (2006) find that even for institutional trades TRACE reduced spreads. In 
contrast, in Europe there is no post-trade transparency. This offers an opportunity to compare 
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liquidity in an opaque market (Europe) to its counterpart in a transparent market (US), while 
keeping other variables constant (security type, year, rating, etc…). 
 
Second, consider the competition between liquidity suppliers. In the US a relatively small 
number of very large banks dominate the market. In the UK also, because Sterling 
denominated bonds attract mostly British market participants, the number of investors and 
liquidity suppliers is limited. In contrast, in the Eurozone, the number of potential liquidity 
suppliers is large. The big international players (Morgan, Merill, Deutsche, etc…) are present 
in the market, along with the national champions from all the Eurozone countries 
(BNPParibas, Unicredito, ABN Amro, etc…). Thus, there will typically be around 20 active 
dealers for each reasonably liquid bond in this market. Comparing the US, UK and Eurozone 
markets thus offers an opportunity to shed light on the impact of competition on transactions 
costs.  
 
Third, Europe offers an opportunity to assess the out of sample robustness of the results 
obtained for the US market, especially those that could sound surprising, in comparison to the 
stylized facts from stock markets: Do we observe relatively large spreads? Are spreads 
decreasing in trade size?  
 
To conduct our analysis we rely on a new quotes and trades dataset, provided to us by the 
International Index Company (IIC) and the International Capital Market Association (ICMA). 
We observe a complete record of time-stamped trades along with daily closing quotes in 
2003, 2004 and 2005 for more than 300 Euro-denominated bonds and more than 300 Sterling 
denominated bonds. Ratings in our sample vary from AAA to BBB; AA and BBB being the 
most frequent categories. In terms of industry structure the bonds we study are not very 
different from those in the US TRACE sample. The dataset we analyze contain 1,844,826 
trades, for which we observe the exact time of the transaction, the price, the quantity, 
characteristics of the bond and an anonymized dealer code.  
 
We find that Euro denominated bonds trade on average 4 times a day and Sterling bonds 1.5 
times a day. Since Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) find an average number of 1.1 trades 
per day, and Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) 1.9 trades a day, our results suggests 
trading frequency is larger in the Eurozone market than in the US. 
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We find that the number of market makers participating in at least one trade during the year is 
above 25 for Euro-denominated bonds and above 15 for Sterling bonds. For Euro 
denominated bonds, the market share of the 5 most active dealers is around 40%, while it 
takes only 3 or 4 dealers to cover 40% of the market for a typical Sterling bond. Thus, there is 
more competition between liquidity suppliers in the Euro denominated market. But, even in 
that market, the largest dealers are likely to enjoy some market power. 
 
For our sample of Euro-denominated bonds, we estimate that effective spreads ranged in 2005 
from .12% for small trades to .08% for large ones, and in 2003 from .22% to .12%. Thus, 
effective spreads in the European corporate bond market decrease with trade size, as found in 
the US market by Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) and Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri 
(2007). Our results also suggest that effective spreads in the Euro zone don’t appear to be 
larger than their post TRACE US counterparts. For 2003, Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri 
(2007) find effective spreads ranging between 2.7% for retail trades and .3% for large trades 
while Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) find effective spreads between .5% for retail 
trades $200,000 and .2% for large trades. Reasonably tight spreads in the Euro denominated 
market are consistent with the presence of a large pool of potential buyers and sellers, 
attracting relatively competitive dealer liquidity. In contrast, we find that effective spreads in 
the Sterling market are larger than in the Euro market. Relatively few investors are active in 
the Sterling market. This leads to low natural liquidity, which, in turn, attracts only a limited 
number of market makers and eventually leads to relatively large transactions costs. 
 
We find that both quoted spreads and effective spreads increase with maturity and default 
risk, in line with the results of Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) and Goldstein, Hotchkiss 
and Sirri (2007) for the US. We also find that spreads increase with dealers’ market power. 
Controlling for other variables, our regression analysis estimates the difference in effective 
spreads between bonds for which the market share of the most active dealers was above 40% 
and other bonds. We find that, in 2003, such market power raised the effective spread by 5.6 
cents for a bond price of €100. In 2004 and 2005 the corresponding figures were .45 cent and 
1.63 cents. 
 
Finally, we analyze the information content of trades, i.e., the amount by which the market 
value of a bond increases after a purchase or decreases after a sale. We find that the 
information content of trades is significant, especially for low rating bonds. For a Euro 
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denominated BBB bond priced at €100, after a purchase the midquote would rise on average 
by 5 cents in 2003, 3 cents in 2004 and 1 cent in 2005. For a sterling denominated bond priced 
at £100, the increase was on average equal to 6 pence in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Such 
information effects account for a significant fraction of the spread. 
 
We also find that, on the day of the trade, only a small portion of its information content is 
impounded in the market quote. It takes at least 5 trading days for the information content of 
the trade to be fully reflected in market pricing. Since there is no post-trade transparency on 
the day of the trade, only the dealer and his customer are informed of it. It takes a week for 
this information to percolate through the market. 
 
The next section describes the institutional features of the European corporate bond market. 
Section II presents our dataset. Section III presents our empirical results. Section IV 
concludes. 
 
I. Institutional Setting 
 
A. Differences with stocks 
 
There are several important differences between the microstructure of the bond market and 
that of the stock market. 
 
First, the characteristics of bonds payoffs (redemption date, relative safety) tend to attract a 
specific type of investors: Pension funds and insurance companies are among the largest 
investors in bonds. They tend to follow buy and hold strategies. This limits the level of 
activity in the secondary market. 
 
Second, at least in Europe, it’s difficult and costly to short sell bonds. This further reduces the 
liquidity of the bond market. When an issue is entirely, or in large part, in the hands of a buy 
and hold investor, it’s difficult to sell it.iv 
 
Third, stock market activity is concentrated in a relatively small number of securities, which 
trade very frequently each day, while the others trade only infrequently. For example, 2,800 
companies are quoted on the NYSE. On this market, the 100 most active stocks account for a 
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little less than half the total trading volume. In contrast, the bond market is less concentrated. 
Each issuer has typically several bonds outstanding. Capitalization and trading are spread 
across thousands of securities. This difference in concentration induces differences in the ease 
with which counterparts can be located. In the stock market, most large operators have an 
interest in the most active securities which constitute the bulk of the market. In the bond 
market, large operators will typically have an interest only in a subset of securities. Hence, in 
the bond market, it can be a more difficult task to identify a counterpart than in the stock 
market. 
 
These institutional features of the bond market tend to reduce its liquidity. The evidence 
reported below documents the extent to which they do. 
 
B. Dealership 
 
The European corporate bond market, like the US market, is an over-the-counter market, 
revolving around dealers and brokers. Suppose an institutional investor desires to trade a 
given bond. He or she will contact one or several dealers, telling them which bond he or she 
wants to trade, the desired quantity, and whether he or she wants to sell. The dealers will then 
make price offers for the whole trade. Eventually, the customer will trade with the best offer, 
or decide not to trade. After trading with customers, dealer often unwind at least part of their 
inventory with other dealers. Alternatively, the investor can contact a broker, who will direct 
the agents to interested counterparties. The sequencing can sometimes be reversed: Brokers or 
dealers can contact investors, informing them of trading opportunities, in given bonds, at 
given prices, and asking them if they would be interested in trading under those conditions. 
 
Dealers are not rewarded by commissions. Their bid and ask prices are net prices. Of course, 
they implicitly factor in the compensation of the dealership services. Hence transactions costs 
will reflect the costs of market making, and also possibly the rents of the dealers. One of the 
goals of this paper is to study the consequences of competition on transactions costs. 
 
Because of their permanent presence on the market, and thanks to the order flow and contacts 
they are exposed to, dealers and brokers are in a good position to cope with the informational 
problems arising in the bond market. They have private information about their recent trades 
and about who is interested in trading. One of the goals of the present paper is to study if there 
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is evidence of such private information and how fast transactions related information gets 
impounded in market pricing. 
 
C. Telephones and screens 
 
Traditionally, institutional investors would call dealers on the phone, negotiate on the price, 
and then possibly call another dealer.v Or the customer would call a phone broker, who would 
call several dealers. The telephone technology limits the number of dealers the customer can 
contact simultaneously. This increases the search costs incurred by the customers when 
searching for the right counterpart or the right bond and limits their ability to let dealers 
compete with one another. This increases the rents of the dealers, particularly when they have 
private information about which bonds are currently traded and who trades them. 
 
Both in Europe and the US, electronic communication now complements telephone. 
Investors, dealers and brokers communicate through Bloomberg screens and messaging 
systems. Investors can purchase access to real time information from Bloomberg. Dealers’ 
quotes are disseminated on screens. These indicative quotes tend to be close to the prices at 
which trades can occur, but they do not directly convey information about the occurrence of 
trades or about transactions prices. In addition, bonds differ markedly in terms of activity, and 
this affects the availability of quotes. Bonds with headline news, or which have been recently 
issued, are actively traded. For such bonds numerous quotes are posted on Bloomberg 
screens. Dealers and brokers also frequently send messages to large institutional investors, via 
the Bloomberg system. Such messages provide indications of trading interest, with prices, size 
and direction. Other bonds are inactively traded. For such bonds, it is difficult – and 
sometimes impossible – to find significant quotes on Bloomberg screens. Recently, electronic 
trading platforms have developed. They can be put in place by a single dealer, offering its 
customer pricing information, or involve several dealers, as illustrated by MarketAxess 
(which is described in the appendix). But electronic trading platforms only amount for a small 
fraction of the corporate bond market, estimated by market participants to be around 3 or 4%.  
 
D. Regulation  
 
The European bond market is a decentralized dealer market, self regulated by the 
International Capital Market Association (ICMA).vi While some dealers are based in 
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continental Europe, most operate from London. The FSA plays a key role in the regulation of 
the European bond market. Other regulators concerned with this market include the Autorité 
des Marchés Financiers (AMF) and the London Stock Exchange. All the dealers belonging to 
ICMA (i.e., the huge majority of the dealers in the European Corporate Bond market) have to 
report their trades to this self regulatory organisation, through a system known as TRAX. 
TRAX captures most of the inter-professional business in continental Europe and the UK. 
Retail trading conducted between European banks and small clients is usually not reported to 
TRAX. TRAX makes its information available to national regulators, such as the FSA in 
London or the AMF in Paris, which can use it for monitoring and surveillance. 
 
E. Transparency and quote dissemination 
 
Currently, the European corporate bond market is not post trade transparent, i.e., transactions 
prices are not publicly disseminated after trades took place. For retail investors and small 
institutions, there is little transparency. But, large investors can obtain quotes from dealers, 
and information disseminated by data vendors or via Bloomberg messaging. The International 
Index Company (IIC), which computes iBoxx indices, disseminates quotes information for 
hundreds of Sterling and of Euro-denominated bonds. 10 dealers (ABN Amro, Barclays 
Capital, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, HSBC, JP Morgan, 
Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank of Scotland and UBS Investment Bank) transmit indicative bid 
and ask quotes to the Deutsche Börse every minute for every bond in the iBoxx universe. 
Once IIC receives this data, it conducts quality controls.vii Then average ask prices and bid 
prices are computed for each bond. IIC sells this data in real time through vendors such as 
Bloomberg, Telerate, Telekurs, Reuters, etc... In addition, daily closing prices can be freely 
observed on the IIC website. While the dealers’ prices used by IIC are only quotes, not 
tradeable prices or transactions prices, it has been confirmed to us by market participants that 
they are quite representative of actual market pricing for institutional size trades. Dealers have 
little incentives to manipulate their quote reports, in particular because i) their reports are 
averaged with those of the others, ii) outliers are excluded by IIC from the computation of the 
average price, and iii) IIC does not disseminate individual, non-anonymous quotes. To ensure 
that the bonds in the index are roughly comparable, iBoxx includes only plain vanilla bonds, 
excluding sinking funds and callable bonds. Furthermore, for the Euro denominated segment 
of the market, only bonds with amount outstanding above € 500 million are included in the 
iBoxx universe. For Sterling denominated bonds, the cutoff is £ 100 million. 
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II. Data 
 
A. Datasets  
 
A.1. The IIC sample 
 
The International Index Company gave us a complete history of daily, end of day, bid and ask 
quotes for Euro and Sterling denominated bonds, from January 2003 to September 2005. For 
2005, we have this data for 1495 bonds, which are the entire universe of corporate bonds 
handled by IIC and included in its corporate bond indices. They represent the majority of the 
European investment grade, plain vanilla, and bond market. For Euro denominated bonds, the 
IIC sample includes 703 securities in 2003, 799 in 2004 and 832 in 2005. For Sterling 
denominated bonds, the IIC sample includes 620 securities in 2003, 678 in 2004 and 663 in 
2005. 
 
The bid and ask quotes are expressed with the convention of a nominal bond price of €100 or 
£100. Thus, except for zero-coupons, the bond prices in our data are typically between 90 and 
110. The IIC data gives separately the bond bid and ask quotes and the accrued interest. The 
latter is a deterministic, pre-specified function of time, independent from the pricing 
behaviour of the dealers. This function exhibits discontinuities around coupon payment days. 
Thus, to work with smooth times-series, reflecting the behaviour of the traders in the 
marketplace, we focus on prices net of accrued interest. 
 
A.2. The TRAX sample 
 
ICMA provided us with transactions data from TRAX. To be able to use jointly the IIC quote 
data and the transactions data from TRAX, we asked ICMA to give us data for bonds included 
in the IIC sample. ICMA gave us a complete record of all trades from January 2003 to 
September 2005. The number of bonds in the TRAX sample for the three years is given in 
Table I. For these securities, we have a complete time stamped record of the transactions 
reports, with characteristics of the bonds (such as its ISIN number, its date of issuance, its 
maturity, and the name of the issuing company) and the trades (such as the price, the quantity, 
whether the dealer reporting the trade was selling or buying, and an anonymized dealer code, 
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which enabled us to compute market shares, reported in the next section). To eliminate 
outliers and erratic observations we discarded the trades that were reported between 
11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., those with value traded below 100 (€ or £) or above above 20 
millions (€ or £). We also eliminated a few observations for which the change in price since 
the last trade was outside the +10%, -10% range. After these eliminations, we have a dataset 
of 1,844,826 transactions. 
 
B. Structure of the sample 
 
B.1. Issue size 
 
As mentioned above, the Euro denominated bonds in our sample have issue size greater than 
or equal to €500 million, while for Sterling denominated bonds the cut off is at £100 million. 
This differs somewhat from the sample analyzed by Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) 
who consider bonds with issue size between $10 million and $1 billion. The average issue 
size for our Euro denominated bond sample is €895,180,671. For the Sterling denominated 
bonds it is (after conversion to Euros) €407,608,630. Thus, the Sterling bonds in our sample 
have smaller issue size on average than their Euro counterparts. 
 
B.2. Industry 
 
The structure of the sample in terms of industries is given in Table I. In both currencies, by far 
the most frequent industry is financials (around 45% for € and 55% for £). This is in line with 
the stylized fact that the fraction of corporate bonds issued by financial firms is quite large in 
Europe. This is comparable with the US sample of BBB bonds studied by Goldstein, 
Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) where financials account for 44% of the bonds. Also in both 
currencies, the second most frequent industry in our sample is utilities (around 12% of the 
bonds for Euros or Sterlings). In comparison, in the US sample studied by Goldstein, 
Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) around 20% of the bonds are issued by utilities. The third most 
frequent industry, for Euro denominated bonds, is telecommunications – a legacy from the 
bubble period. This differs from the Sterling and US samples. 
 
B.3. Maturity and rating 
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Table II presents the structure of our samples in terms of rating and maturity at issuance. For 
each maturity and rating and for each currency, the table shows the number of bonds in the 
IIC sample and the number of bonds in the TRAX sample. Inspecting the table, one can see 
that our TRAX sample is quite representative of our IIC sample. (Note however that the 
number of bonds in our sample is much lower than in the samples analysed by Edwards, 
Harris and Piwowar (2007) and Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007), which included 16,746 
and 5,503 bonds, respectively.) 
 
For both currencies, the most frequent rating is A. AA and BBB-rated bonds also are frequent. 
There is only a small number of AAA. This differs, by construction from the sample of BBB 
US bonds analysed by Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) and from the sample of bonds 
analysed by Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007), which included speculative grade bonds 
(with ratings lower than BBB). For Euro denominated bonds, the most frequent maturities at 
issuance are 5, 7 and 10 years. For Sterling denominated bonds, the most frequent maturities 
are 10 years, 15 years and 20 years. Thus, the Sterling denominated bonds tend to have longer 
maturities than their Euro counterparts. 
 
Overall, these descriptive statistics suggest that our sample is relatively broad and quite 
representative of European investment grade bonds. While it includes a smaller number of 
bonds, it is not markedly different from the US samples studied by Goldstein, Hotchkiss and 
Sirri (2007) and Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007). Note also that our sample only 
includes plain vanilla bonds, like the sample of Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007), while 
that of Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) includes bonds with complex features (callable, 
convertible, sinking, etc…). 
 
III. Empirical Results 
 
A. Trading activity 
 
For each bond in the TRAX sample, we computed the average number of trades per day and 
per bond. Euro-denominated bonds trade on average 4.84 a day in 2003, 4.79 in 2004 and 
3.95 in 2005. For Sterling bonds, the corresponding figures are 1.26, 1.91 and 1.63, 
respectively. These trading frequencies are low, relatively to their counterparts from the stock 
market. This reflects the features of bond markets mentioned above, especially that i) many 
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institutional investors often buy and hold bonds without retrading them and that ii) liquidity is 
spread across a large number of bonds. 
 
Note however that the Euro denominated bonds in our sample are more frequently traded than 
the US corporate bonds analysed by Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) and Edwards, 
Harris and Piwowar (2007). Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007), focusing on BBB bonds, 
find an average number of 1.1 trades per day. This is lower than the average number of trades 
in our sample for BBB bonds, which is above 7 for Euros and 3 for Sterlings. Edwards, Harris 
and Piwowar (2007), study bonds spanning several ratings, and find an average number of 
trades per day equal to 1.9, again lower than what we find. This is all the more striking that 
our dataset, in contrast with those of Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) and Goldstein, 
Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) does not include the small trades. The latter, although small in 
terms of total dollar trading volume, account for more than half the number of trades in the 
TRACE sample. 
 
Table III Panel A shows how the average number of trades varies with issue size. As 
expected, both for Euros and Sterlings, trades are more frequent for bonds with larger issue 
size. Sterling denominated bonds tend to have lower issue size and also trade less frequently 
on average. Panel B shows how the average daily number of trades varies with maturity. 
Bonds with maturity equal to 5 years or 10 years are relatively more frequently traded than 
other bonds, maybe because these bonds are viewed as benchmarks, on which trading is 
focussed. We also studied the relation between trading frequency and rating and found that 
AAA and BBB rated bonds trade more frequently than AA and A. This reflects the interaction 
of two countervailing effects. On the one hand, high rating can increase liquidity by reducing 
adverse selection. On the other hand, news is more frequent for riskier bonds, and investors 
react to news by trading. 
 
For each bond in our TRAX sample, we also computed the average daily volume traded. For 
Euro denominated bonds, the average across bonds was € 4,590,669 in 2003, 3,959,877 in 
2004 and 3,649,923 in 2005. For Sterling denominated bonds, the corresponding figures, 
converted in Euros, were 1,213,346 in 2003, 1,641,220 in 2004 and 1,538,373 in 2005. Thus, 
also in terms of volume, the Euro denominated market is larger than the Sterling market. 
 
B. Market concentration 
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For the Euro-denominated bonds in our TRAX sample, the number of market makers 
participating in at least one trade during the year was 29 in 2003, 27 in 2004 and 24 in 2005. 
For the Sterling denominated bonds, the number of active dealers per bond was 18 in 2003 
and 2004 and 16 in 2005. 
 
Figure 1 plots, as a function of N, the market share of the N largest dealers. It shows that 
market concentration was larger for Sterling than for Euro bonds. For Euros, the average 
market share of the most active dealer in each bond was 12.48% in 2003, 9.04% in 2004 and 
8.95% in 2005. For Sterling bonds, the market share of the most active dealer was on average 
12.03% in 2003, 14.28% in 2004 and 14.74% in 2005. Furthermore, for Euro denominated 
bonds, the market share of the 5 most active dealers was on average 40.1% in 2003, 34.11% 
in 2004 and 34.61% in 2005. For Sterling denominated bonds, the corresponding figures were 
53.7%, 54.9% and 54.2%. For the average Sterling bond, the 4 largest dealers made more than 
40% of the trades. 
 
Thus, while there was some competition in the market, with around 15 to 20 dealers 
participating in trades for each bond, the most active dealers were likely to enjoy some market 
power. Also, competition and dealer participation were more limited for Sterling bonds. These 
bonds have lower issue size and attract less many investors, this leads to less natural liquidity, 
and attracts less many dealers. 
 
C. Quoted spreads 
 
Consider the quotes in the IIC dataset. Denote the (end of day) ask and bid prices for bond i 
on day t by Ai,t and Bi,t, respectively. The (end of day) midquote for that bond and that day is: 
Mi,t = (Ai,t + Bi,t)/2,      (1) 
and the (proportional) quoted spread is: 
Si,t = (Ai,t - Bi,t)/Mi,t.      (2) 
Relying on the IIC dataset, we first computed, for each bond, and each day, the end of day 
closing (proportional) spread. Then for each bond in our IIC sample, we computed the 
average quoted spread and we studied the distribution of this average across bonds. 
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For Euro denominated bonds, we find that the average quoted spread is .3952% in 2003, 
.3008% in 2004 and .2815% in 2005. Thus, in 2005, the quoted bid-ask spread was equal to 
28.15 cents, for a bond with nominal price equal to €100. For the Sterling denominated bonds, 
the corresponding figures were .6676%, .5026% and .4589% respectively. That quoted 
spreads are larger for the Sterling market is consistent with the above reported findings that 
trades are less frequent and market makers less numerous in this market. 
 
To study the determinants of quoted spreads, for each year in our sample we regressed across 
bonds the average quoted spread onto characteristics of the bond: The log of the € issue size, 
an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the bond was denominated in Sterling, rating, 
industry, residual maturity, an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the market share of the 
most active dealer in this bond was above 40%. 
 
The results are reported in Table IV. They indicate that quoted spreads in the European 
corporate bond market vary with economic forces, as suggested by theory.viii Market 
microstructure models of dealer markets imply that spreads should increase with the inventory 
bearing costs of the dealers (see e.g., Ho and Stoll, 1983, Biais, 1993, or the survey by Biais, 
Glosten and Spatt, 2005). Inventory costs increase with the risk that the value of the security 
will vary a lot. In the case of bonds, this risk increases with the maturity of the bond and its 
credit risk (proxied by its rating). Consistently with these implications of the theory, we find 
that quoted bid-ask spreads in the European corporate bond market increase with maturity and 
decrease with credit quality. Microstructure models also imply that spreads should be larger 
when the market is concentrated among a small number of market makers (see e.g., Biais, 
Martimort and Rochet (2000)). Consistently with this implication, the indicator variable 
taking the value 1 when the most active dealer covered more than 40% of the market is 
significantly positive for 2003 and 2005. Furthermore, quoted spreads are significantly 
decreasing in issue size. This reflects that bonds issued in larger amount have more holders 
and greater natural liquidity than small issues. 
 
The indicator variable taking the value one when the bond is denominated in Sterling is not 
significant. This suggests that, for quoted spreads, there are no significant differences between 
Sterling and Euro bonds beyond differences in the observable characteristics taken into 
account in our regressions. The most significant of these differences are that bonds have 
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longer maturities and smaller issue size and dealers have greater market power in the Sterling 
market. 
 
D. Effective spreads 
 
D.1. Method 
 
Consider bond i on day t and the case where there is at least one trade for this bond during 
that day. Consider the nth transaction reported for bond i on day t in the TRAX dataset. 
Denote the transaction price by: Pi,n,t and the direction of the trade by: Zi,n,t. Zi,n,t takes the 
value one if the customer purchases from the dealer and minus one if the customer sells to the 
dealer. Finally, denote the fundamental value of bond i by vi. This is the risk adjusted 
discounted value of the cash flows to be distributed by the bond. Just before the nth trade in 
bond i on day t, the expectation by the market of the fundamental value of the bond is: 
Vi,n,t = E[vi |Hi,n,t-].     (3) 
In markets without post-trade transparency, it is not straightforward to define the information 
set of the market. In our analysis, we take Hi to be the information common to the 10 large 
dealers contributing to Iboxx and we accordingly use the midquote Mi,t-1 (from the IIC 
dataset) as a proxy for the fundamental value. More precisely, we assume that: 
Mi,t-1 = E[vi |Hi,t-1] = E(Vi,n,t|Hi,t-1),     (4) 
where Hi,t-1 is the information set of the market at  the end of day t-1. Thus we have: 
E[vi |Hi,n,t-]= Mi,t-1 + εi,n,t,     (5) 
where εi,n,t is the informational innovation from the end of day t-1 to the time of the nth trade 
on day t. By definition: E(εi,n,t |Hi,t-1)=0. We also assume that E(εi,n,t Zi,n,t |Hi,t-1)=0, i.e., trades 
direction is unpredictable, as in Kyle (1985). 
 
The effective half-spread for this transaction is: 
Zi,n,t (Pi,n t - Vi,n,t) =  Zi,n,t (Pi,n t - Mi,t-1) + Zi,n,t  εi,n,t.   (6) 
Note that: 
E[Zi,n,t (Pi,n t - Vi,n,t)] = E[E{Zi,n,t (Pi,n t - Vi,n,t) |Hi,t-1}]  
= E[E{ Zi,n,t (Pi,n t - Mi,t-1) + Zi,n,t  εi,n,t |Hi,t-1}]   (7) 
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= E[E{ Zi,n,t (Pi,n t - Mi,t-1)|Ht-1}] =  E[Zi,n,t (Pi,n t - Mi,t-1)]. 
Thus, we use the empirical average of Zi,n,t (Pi,n t - Mi,t-1) to estimate the effective half-spread. 
Note that to compute this we use both data from TRAX (for Zi,n,t and Pi,n t) and data from IIC 
(for Mi,t-1). 
 
Some bonds in our data have different price levels than others. For example, while most 
prices in our data are around 100 (corresponding to a nominal of 100), we have some zero-
coupons, with prices much below 100. To ensure comparability of the results across bonds 
with potentially different price levels, we normalize the variables by the previous days’ 
midquote. Thus, we consider proportional effective spreads. 
 
D.2. Results 
 
For Euro denominated bonds, we find an average effective spread equal to .169% in 2003, 
.073% in 2004 and .10% in 2005. For Sterling bonds, the corresponding figures are .411%, 
.211% and .202% respectively.ix Thus, in line with our above reported findings on quoted 
spreads, effective spreads are tighter for Euro than for Sterling bonds. 
 
In both currencies, the effective spread is tighter than the quoted spread. This was to be 
expected. Consider the case of an investor who wants to buy a bond. Suppose the 10 best 
dealers in the market are those who post quotes on IIC. Assume the customer runs an auction 
between these 10 dealers. Suppose the dealers’ offers to the customer are equal to their IIC 
quotes. Then the customer will choose to trade at the best ask, which is the minimum of these 
ten quotes. This minimum will by construction be lower than the average of the ten ask 
quotes. The effective spread is computed on the basis of this minimum ask quote, while the 
quoted spread is computed based on the average ask quote. 
 
To study the determinants of effective spreads, we regressed them onto characteristics of the 
bond. We used the same set of regressors as for quoted spreads: Log of issue size, an indicator 
for Sterling, rating, industry, residual maturity and market power. 
 
Table V presents the results. Similarly to quoted spreads, effective spreads in the European 
corporate bond market decrease with issue size and increase with maturity, default risk and 
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dealer market power. Our finding that effective spreads and quoted spreads tend to react 
similarly with economic forces suggests that the two datasets used to construct these variables 
(IIC and TRAX) consistently capture similar phenomena. Our regression analysis enables one 
to evaluate the consequences of an increase in market power, controlling for other variables. 
More precisely, it estimates the difference in spreads between bonds for which the market 
share of the most active dealer was above 40% and other bonds. The results in Table V show 
that, for a bond price of €100, market power raised the effective spread by 5.6 cents in 2003, 
.45 cent in 2004 and 1.63 cents in 2005. 
 
In contrast with quoted spreads, for effective spreads the indicator variable taking the value 
one when the bond is denominated in Sterling is significant. This suggests that, after 
controlling for longer maturity, smaller issue sizes and greater dealer market power, the 
Sterling market is still less liquid than its Euro counterpart. This is likely to reflect the smaller 
number of market participants. 
 
Table VI presents effective spreads by trade size. In line with the analyses conducted by 
Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) and Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) for the US 
bond market, we find that spreads decreased with trade size for the Sterling market and also 
for the Euro market in 2003 and 2004. Our findings on the relationship between spreads and 
maturity are consistent with those of Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) and Edwards, 
Harris and Piwowar (2007). Our results are also consistent with the result, by Edwards, Harris 
and Piwowar (2007), that spreads decrease as credit risk decreases. This suggests that the 
economics of the secondary markets for bonds are not fundamentally different in Europe and 
in the US. 
 
On the other hand, our estimates of effective spreads in the Euro market are lower than 
corresponding estimates from the US market. For bonds with a wide range of ratings, 
Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) find average effective spreads of .54% for trade sized at 
$200,000 and spreads of .22% for trades sized at $1,000,000. This is above the effective 
spreads we find for the Euro market in 2003, which range from .218% for retail trades to 
.118% for large institutional trades. 
 
To facilitate the comparison between the European market and the US market, we also studied 
a sub-sample of our data that is closely comparable to the dataset studied by Goldstein, 
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Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007). This sub-sample includes only data from 2003, and only BBB 
bonds with issue size below one billion dollars. The 51 Euro denominated bonds and 85 
Sterling denominated bonds in this sub-sample are very similar, in terms of rating, industry 
and issue size to those analyzed by Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007). The results are 
reported in Table VII. For comparison, the table also reports the effective spreads estimated 
for their sample of transparent bonds by Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007, Table VII). The 
findings in Table VII suggest that effective spreads in 2003 were lower in the European 
market for Euro denominated bonds than in the post-TRACE transparent market. Consider 
two examples, towards the extremes of the trade size spectrum: For retail trades, sized 
between $10,000 and $20,000, the average effective spread for Euro denominated bonds was 
.40%, while in the TRACE data it was 2.34%. For relatively large trades, sized between 
$250,000 and $1,000,000, the average effective spread was .16% for Euro denominated bonds 
and .37% for TRACE transparent bonds. 
 
Along with our finding that trading frequency is greater for our sample of European bonds 
than for the TRACE samples analysed by Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) and Edwards, 
Harris and Piwowar (2007), these results suggest the European corporate bond market is 
relatively liquid compared to its US counterpart. This is likely to reflect the integration of 
financial markets in the Eurozone. Investors and banks from all the Eurozone countries can 
trade in bonds from all these countries. This increases the number of potential investors as 
well as the number of dealers, resulting in greater liquidity. 
 
E. Information content of trades 
 
E.1. Method 
 
From a theoretical standpoint trades in the corporate market might well reflect private 
information. Bonds are, by construction less sensitive than stocks to the performance of the 
firm.x Yet, as long as there is default risk, changes in the performance of the firm should 
impact the value of the bond. Thus, traders with superior information about the performance 
of the issuing firm should use the bond market, along with the stock market, as a vehicle for 
their trades. This is especially true for bonds with low ratings. The information content of the 
nth trade in bond i on day t can be expressed as: 
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E[Zi,n,t (E[vi |Hi,n,t+] - E[vi |Hi,n,t-])],     (8) 
where Hi,n,t+  is the information set of the market just after the trade. In words, the information 
content of the trade is the product between the change in assessment of the value of the bond 
and the direction of the trade. If purchases (resp. sales) convey positive (resp. negative) 
signals about the value of the bonds, then, when Zi,n,t = +1 (resp. -1), there will be an increase 
(resp. decrease) in the market expectation of the value of the bond and E[vi |Hi,n,t+] will be 
above (resp. below) E[vi |Hi,n,t-]). Hence the product in (8) will be positive on average, and the 
expectation bounded above 0. In contrast, if the direction of trades conveys no systematic 
information to the market, and thus are independent from changes in assessments of the value 
of the bond, the expectation in (8) will be equal to 0. 
 
Similarly to the previous subsection, we write, 
Mi,t = E[vi |Hi,n,t+] + ηi,n,t,     (9) 
where ηi,n,t is the informational innovation from just after the trade until the end of day t 
(E(ηi,n,t | Hi,n,t+)=0). Hence, the informational content of the trade rewrites as: 
E[Zi,n,t ((Mi,t  - Mi,t-1) - (ηi,n,t +εi,n,t))].   (10) 
By construction, ηi,n,t is unpredictable conditionally on Hi,n,t+. Hence: 
E[Zi,n,t ηi,n,t]=0.      (11) 
We maintain the assumption that E[Zi,n,t εi,n,t| Hi,n,t,]=0. Hence, we estimate the information 
content of trades with the empirical average of Zi,n,t (Mi,t  - Mi,t-1). As in the analysis of 
effective spreads, to ensure comparability of the results across bonds with potentially different 
price levels, we normalize the variables by the previous day midquote. 
 
Since there is no post-trade transparency, market quotes (which average the quotes of the 10 
Iboxx contributors) may take more than one day to impound the informational content of the 
trade. Indeed, when one dealer conducts a trade, only this dealer and his customer are 
informed of it. To estimate how long it takes for the market to incorporate the information 
contained in the trade, we compute 5 different measures of the information content of trades. 
Suppose the trade occurs on Monday, the average of Zi,n,t (Mi,t  - Mi,t-1) measures the 
information content of this trade by comparing the previous day’s quote (from Friday) to the 
closing quote on Monday. The average of Zi,n,t (Mi,t+1  - Mi,t-1) is a similar measure using the 
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closing quote from the next day (Tuesday in our example). Similarly, we also compute 
information content measures using Mi,t+2, Mi,t+3, Mi,t+4, and Mi,t+5 (corresponding to 
Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Monday in our example). 
 
E.2. Findings 
 
Our results are graphically represented in Figure 2. Quite remarkably, for both currencies and 
for the three years, our measure of information content rises with the horizon. On the day of 
the trade, only a small portion of its information content is impounded in the closing quote. 
An additional fraction of the information gets incorporated in the quotes the next day. And 
this continues during 5 days! Such slow incorporation of trading information into prices is due 
to the lack of post-trade transparency. When the trade occurs, only the trading dealer and the 
customer are informed of it. It takes at least a week for the rest of the market to learn this 
information. 
 
Figure 2 also shows that the information content of trades is greater for bonds with greater 
default risk, as implied by theory. In Panels A, B, D, E and F, bonds rated BBB have the 
highest information content of trades. In Panel C they have the second highest. Also, the 
information content of trades is larger in the Sterling market than in its Euro counterpart. For 
BBB bonds it is significantly higher than 5 pence for a £100 bond price, which is almost one-
half of the effective spread. Higher information content for Sterling trades could reflect that, 
for Euro denominated bonds, there is more publicly available information, for example more 
research or more analysts following. Correspondingly there would be less information 
asymmetry. 
 
In general it’s difficult to disentangle information effects from inventory effects. But, in our 
case, it’s highly unlikely that our estimator of the information content of trades picks up 
inventory effects. First, to estimate it we rely on IIC quotes, which are obtained by averaging 
the quotes of 10 large dealers. Thus, even if the trading dealer is one these 10 market makers, 
the inventory impact of his trade on his price is diluted in the averaging of 10 quotes. Second, 
the impact of inventory on prices decreases with time, as the dealer unwinds his inventory. 
This contrasts with our finding that the information content of trades increases over the course 
of 5 days. Our finding that trades impact midquotes for at least a week is in line with 
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Hasbrouck’s (1991) analysis of the information content of trades in terms of permanent price 
impact. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This paper offers a first study of the microstructure of the European corporate bond market. 
Some of our findings are in tune with those obtained by previous studies, relying on the 
TRACE data, from the US market (see Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007), Goldstein, 
Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) and Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006)): Bid ask 
spreads in the European corporate bond market increase with inventory bearing costs, as 
predicted by theory. They also decrease with trade size and with issue size.  
 
Our study also offers new results: 
• We document how transactions costs in European corporate bond markets increase 
with dealers’ market power. 
• We also find that effective spreads are tighter and liquidity supply is more 
competitive for Euro denominated bonds than for Sterling denominated ones. 
• And we find that spreads for Euro denominated bonds compare favourably to their 
TRACE transparent US counterparts. 
We interpret these findings as suggesting that financial and monetary integration has spurred 
investors’ participation and competition between banks from different Eurozone countries, 
resulting in greater liquidity. 
 
Another contribution of this paper is to document the information content of trades in 
European corporate bonds. We find evidence of such information effects, especially for low 
rating bonds. We also find that it takes on average at least 5 trading days for the information 
content of trades to be fully impounded in market pricing. Such a long delay is likely to be 
due to the lack of post-trade transparency in the European market. It would be extremely 
instructive to run in that market an experiment similar to TRACE (which has been studied by 
Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007), Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) and 
Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006)). Our analysis suggests that such an 
increase in transparency would accelerate the incorporation of transactions related 
information into market pricing. 
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Table I 
Number of bonds in our TRAX sample, for different industries 
 
For each currency and year, and for each of the 9 industries considered, the Table reports the 
number of bonds in our sample as well as the proportion of the sample corresponding to that 
industry. 
 
Panel A: Euro denominated bonds 
 
 2003 2004 2005 
 
Number of 
bonds 
% of 
sample
Number of 
bonds 
% of 
sample
Number of  
bonds 
% of  
sample 
Basic Materials 10 4% 22 4% 22 4% 
Consumer Goods or Services 51 18% 103 18% 100 16% 
Financials 121 43% 264 45% 288 46% 
Health Care 1 0% 5 1% 4 1% 
Industrials 21 7% 44 7% 46 7% 
Oil & Gas 8 3% 18 3% 20 3% 
Technology 1 0% 2 0% 3 0% 
Telecommunications 36 13% 51 9% 56 9% 
Utilities 32 11% 78 13% 81 13% 
  281   587   620   
 
Panel B: Sterling denominated bonds 
 
 2003 2004 2005 
 
Number of 
bonds 
% of  
sample
Number of 
bonds 
% of  
sample
Number of 
bonds 
% of  
sample 
Basic Materials 6 2% 7 1% 7 1% 
Consumer Goods or Services 54 16% 87 17% 88 17% 
Financials 182 55% 294 58% 316 59% 
Health Care 2 1% 2 0% 2 0% 
Industrials 23 7% 29 6% 29 5% 
Oil & Gas 5 2% 13 3% 14 3% 
Technology 1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 
Telecommunications 12 4% 18 4% 17 3% 
Utilities 44 13% 55 11% 58 11% 
 329  506  532  
 
 
 25
Table II 
Structure by maturity & rating of the IIC & TRAX samples in 2005 
 
 
Panel A 
Number of Euro Denominated Bonds in the IIC & TRAX 2005 samples 
 
The first four columns (AAA, AA, A and B) refer to bonds which kept the same rating. In 
each cell, the first figure is the number of bonds in the IIC sample, while the second figure (in 
parentheses) is the number of bonds in the TRAX sample. The next four columns (AA to A, A 
to AA, A to BBB, and BBB to A) refer to bonds in the IIC sample which changed rating 
during the sample period. In the last row and the last column, the first figure gives the number 
of bonds in the IIC sample, while the second figure (in parentheses) gives the number of 
bonds in the TRAX sample. 
 
  AAA AA A BBB AA/AAA A/AA A/BBB Total 
1                                 
2         2                   2 (0) 
3 2   1 (1) 1 (1) 6 (6)             10 (8) 
4 6 (5)     1   1 (1)         1   9 (6) 
5 15 (11) 27 (18) 64 (43) 59 (36)     2   1 (1) 168 (109)
6     3 (3) 10 (8) 2 (2)             15 (13)
7 7 (6) 10 (8) 59 (42) 92 (66) 1   2 (2) 2 (2) 173 (126)
8 1       3 (3) 2 (1)         1   7 (4) 
9                                 
10 8 (5) 70 (49) 186 (151) 87 (71)     3 (2) 1 (1) 355 (279)
15     11 (9) 30 (27) 7 (6)     1       49 (42)
20     2 (1) 17 (17) 6 (4)             25 (22)
Longer     5 (1) 7 (5) 7 (5)             19 (11)
Total 39 (27) 129 (90) 380 (297) 269 (198) 1 (0) 8 (4) 6 (4) 832 (620)
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Table II (Contd.) - Panel B 
Number of Sterling Denominated Bonds in the IIC & TRAX 2005 samples 
 
The first four columns (AAA, AA, A and B) refer to bonds which kept the same rating from. 
In each cell, the first figure is the number of bonds in the IIC sample, while the second figure 
(in parentheses) is the number of bonds in the TRAX sample. The next columns (AA to A, A 
to AA, A to BBB, and BBB to A) refer to bonds in the IIC sample which changed rating 
during the sample period. In the last row and the last column, the first figure gives the number 
of bonds in the IIC sample, while the second figure (in parentheses) gives the number of 
bonds in the TRAX sample. 
 
  AAA AA A BBB AA/AAA A/AA A/BBB Total 
1                                 
2 1 (1) 4 (3) 2 (2) 1               8 (6) 
3 3 (2) 6 (4) 11 (11) 5 (5)             25 (22) 
4 3 (3) 7 (7) 1 (1) 1 (1)             12 (12) 
5 4 (4) 17 (14) 13 (10) 4 (3)             38 (31) 
6 3 (3) 5 (4) 7 (5) 6 (3)             21 (15) 
7 1 (1) 4 (4) 15 (10) 10 (7)             30 (22) 
8     1 (1) 2 (2) 4 (3)             7 (6) 
9     4 (3)     2 (1)             6 (4) 
10 10 (10) 33 (23) 60 (50) 71 (56)     2 (2) 1 (1) 177 (142)
15 3 (3) 10 (9) 46 (41) 37 (27)     1 (1) 1 (1) 98 (82) 
20 6 (5) 16 (15) 48 (41) 23 (15)             93 (76) 
Longer 12 (10) 30 (19) 70 (56) 36 (29)             148 (114)
Total 46 (42) 137 (106) 275 (229) 200 (150)     3 (3) 2 (2) 663 (532)
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Table III 
Average daily number of trades in the TRAX sample 
 
Panel A 
Average daily number of trades by issue size 
 
For each bond we computed the average numbed of trades per day. Then, we computed the 
cross sectional mean of these averages for each issue size category (for Sterling denominated 
bonds, we converted Sterling amounts into €, using the exchange rate prevailing at the 
beginning of the year). 
 
 Euro denominated bonds Sterling denominated bonds 
 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
All bonds 4.84 4.79 3.95 1.26 1.91 1.63 
€ (0-200.000.000] - - - 0.31 0.35 0.31 
€ (200.000.000-300.000.000] - - - 0.72 1.00 0.85 
€ (300.000.000-400.000.000] - - - 1.28 1.43 1.38 
€ (400.000.000-500.000.000] 1.83 2.75 2.02 1.49 2.21 1.81 
€ (500.000.000-600.000.000] 1.81 2.71 2.09 2.54 3.07 2.47 
€ (600.000.000-700.000.000] 2.58 3.43 2.56 2.06 3.59 3.04 
€ (700.000.000-800.000.000] 3.96 4.18 2.94 2.45 3.44 2.94 
€ (800.000.000-900.000.000] 4.22 3.29 4.53 2.31 3.63 2.64 
€ (900.000.000-1.000.000.000] 4.32 5.22 4.44 2.11 5.05 2.97 
Above €1.000.000.000 10.97 9.61 8.63 2.74 3.80 3.79 
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Table III (Contd.) - Panel B 
Average daily number of trades by maturity 
 
For each bond we computed the average numbed of trades per day. Then. we computed the 
cross sectional mean of these averages for each maturity category. The categories are defined 
in terms of maturity at issuance.  
 
 Euro denominated bonds Sterling denominated bonds 
 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
All bonds 4.84 4.79 3.95 1.26 1.91 1.63 
1 - - - - - - 
2 - - - - 3.49 1.51 
3 9.07 8.76 9.38 - 4.14 2.14 
4 11.23 4.38 3.69 0.88 3.80 2.68 
5 7.54 5.95 5.21 2.00 2.80 2.00 
6 5.63 8.57 5.00 3.95 4.49 4.99 
7 4.04 4.63 3.52 1.90 2.52 2.85 
8 15.85 7.16 5.47 0.82 1.50 2.08 
9 - - - 0.93 1.49 0.91 
10 3.59 3.81 3.20 1.67 1.98 2.01 
15 2.12 3.96 2.85 1.00 1.61 1.17 
20 4.43 6.23 4.88 0.62 1.24 0.82 
Longer 10.07 11.35 12.06 0.90 1.21 1.06 
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Table IV 
Regression of quoted spread on bond characteristics 
 
For each bond we computed the average quoted spread. We then regressed this average across 
bonds onto predetermined variables: issue size (in €), an indicator variable taking the value 1 
if the bond was denominated in Sterling, rating dummies, industry dummies, residual maturity 
and an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the market share of the most active dealer in 
this bond was above 40%. 
 
 
  2003  2004   2005 
  Estimate T-value  Estimate T-value   Estimate T-value 
Intercept 0,031464 6,94 0,023764 13,12  0,014151 8,24 
Issue size -0,001380 -6,37 -0,001100 -12,66  -0,000641 -7,76 
Sterling -0,000362 -1,02 -0,000058 -0,45  -0,000049 -0,41 
AAA -0,003063 -5,76 -0,001206 -6,44  -0,001159 -6,72 
AA -0,002671 -8,13 -0,000687 -5,12  -0,000745 -5,96 
A -0,002307 -9,19 -0,000700 -6,86  -0,000747 -7,84 
Residual maturity 0,000225 14,37 0,000188 29,57  0,000221 37,14 
Market share of most active dealer 
above 40% 0,001128 3,75 -0,000210 -1,95  0,000351 3,25 
Basic Materials 0,000365 0,51 0,000403 1,39  0,000616 2,24 
Consumer Goods 0,000054 0,12 0,000063 0,34  0,000846 4,81 
Financials 0,001208 2,81 0,000535 2,96  0,000375 2,25 
Health Care 0,000312 0,21 0,000621 1,19  0,000623 1,16 
Industrials 0,001461 2,77 0,000704 3,13  0,001010 4,80 
Oil and Gas 0,001147 1,49 0,000864 3,00  0,000827 3,13 
Technology 0,007210 4,11 0,001811 2,35  0,001668 2,60 
Utilities 0,001008 2,13 0,000652 3,23  0,000680 3,63 
R² 0,5026  0,6188   0,6449 
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Table V 
Regression of effective spreads on bond characteristics 
 
For each bond, we computed the effective quoted spread. We then regressed this average 
across bonds onto predetermined variables: issue size (in €), an indicator variable taking the 
value 1 if the bond was denominated in Sterling, rating dummies, industry dummies, residual 
maturity and an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the market share of the most active 
dealer in this bond was above 40%. 
 
 
  2003   2004   2005 
  Estimate T-value   Estimate T-value   Estimate T-value 
Intercept 0,005983 2,32  0,003754 3,22  0,002294 2,10 
Issue size -0,000273 -2,21  -0,000180 -3,21  -0,000101 -1,92 
Sterling 0,000404 1,99  0,000320 3,84  0,000210 2,74 
AAA -0,000247 -0,82  -0,000477 -3,96  -0,000429 -3,91 
AA -0,000751 -4,02  -0,000212 -2,46  -0,000200 -2,52 
A -0,000590 -4,13  -0,000275 -4,19  -0,000359 -5,93 
Residual maturity 0,000060 6,78  0,000040 9,72  0,000041 10,99 
Market share of most active dealer above 
40% 0,000538 3,14  0,000049 0,70  0,000166 2,43 
Basic Materials 0,000606 1,49  0,000366 1,97  0,000223 1,28 
Consumer Goods 0,000419 1,67  0,000230 1,91  0,000352 3,15 
Financials 0,000459 1,88  0,000172 1,48  0,000162 1,53 
Health Care -0,000072 -0,09  0,000268 0,80  -0,000004 -0,01 
Industrials 0,000345 1,15  0,000227 1,57  0,000302 2,26 
Oil and Gas 0,000563 1,28  0,000183 0,99  0,000186 1,11 
Technology 0,002403 2,41  0,000596 1,20  0,000352 0,86 
Utilities 0,000574 2,13  0,000114 0,88  0,000202 1,70 
R² 0,2555   0,2271   0,2097 
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Table VI 
Effective spreads by trade size for the entire European bonds sample 
 
For each bond, we split trades across trade size categories. These categories are the same for 
Euro and for Sterling denominated bonds. For the latter, amounts are converted into Euros, 
using the exchange rate prevailing at the time of the trade. We then computed the effective 
quoted spread for each bond, in each trade size category. Finally we computed the average 
across bond of the effective spread, for each trade size category.  
 
 2003 2004 2005 
Euros    
    
€ [0 - 10.000] 0.218% 0.100% 0.104% 
€ ]10.000 - 25.000] 0.204% 0.109% 0.119% 
€ ]25.000 - 50.000] 0.216% 0.089% 0.108% 
€ ]50.000 - 100.000] 0.184% 0.095% 0.100% 
€ ]100.000 - 200.000] 0.194% 0.079% 0.113% 
€ ]200.000 - 500.000] 0.154% 0.059% 0.109% 
€ ]500.000 - 1.000.000] 0.127% 0.058% 0.103% 
€ ]1.000.000 - ] 0.118% 0.057% 0.082% 
    
Sterling    
    
€ [0 - 10.000] 0.611% 0.340% 0.287% 
€ ]10.000 - 25.000] 0.515% 0.330% 0.272% 
€ ]25.000 - 50.000] 0.405% 0.225% 0.230% 
€ ]50.000 - 100.000] 0.431% 0.234% 0.203% 
€ ]100.000 - 200.000] 0.371% 0.209% 0.210% 
€ ]200.000 - 500.000] 0.391% 0.168% 0.175% 
€ ]500.000 - 1.000.000] 0.416% 0.164% 0.148% 
€ ]1.000.000 - ] 0.349% 0.163% 0.170% 
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Table VII 
Effective spreads by trade size in 2003 for BBB bonds 
 
For 2003, we considered BBB European bonds. We converted trade size and issue size into 
dollars, using the exchange rate from January 2, 2003. We selected the bonds with issue size 
between $10,000,000 and $1,000,000,000. This left us with 51 Euro denominated bonds and 
85 Sterling denominated bonds. For each bond, we split trades across trade size categories. 
We then computed the effective quoted spread for each bond, in each trade size category. 
Finally we computed the average across bond of the effective spread, for each trade size 
category. For the sake of comparison, the table also reports the effective spreads estimated by 
Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri for BBB bonds, with issue size below 1,000,000,000, relying 
on data from 2003. 
 
 
 European Sample TRACE sample 
 Bonds denominated in: Transparent bonds 
 Euro Sterling Goldstein, Hotchkiss & Sirri (2007)
< $10,000 0.40 0.75 2.74 
[$10,000 ; $20,000] 0.29 0.64 2.34 
($20,000 ; $50,000] 0.32 0.62 1.88 
($50,000 ; $100,000] 0.27 0.70 .66 
($100,000 ; $250,000] 0.25 0.52 .35 
($250,000 ; $1,000,000] 0.16 0.42 .37 
> $1,000,000 0.13 0.44 .27 
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Figure 1: Market share of the dealers. This figure depicts the market share of the N most 
active dealers in a bond. The horizontal axis is the number of dealers. N. The vertical axis is 
the market share (in terms of number of trades) of these N dealers. 
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Panel A: Information content of trades, 2003, €
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Panel B: Information content of trades, 2004, €
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Panel C: Information content of trades, 2005, €
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Figure 2: Information content of trades. This figure depicts the average across bonds of the 
time-series average increase (resp. decrease) in midquote after a purchase (resp. sale). For a trade 
occurring on day t, the figure plots the percentage change in midquote from day t-1 to day t+i, 
i=0.1.2.3.4.5. 
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Panel D: Information content of trades, 2003, £
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Panel D: Information content of trades, 2004, £
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Panel E: Information content of trades, 2005, £
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Figure 2: Information content of trades (Contd.) 
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Appendix: The MarketAxess Electronic Bond Trading Platform 
 
The customers of MarketAxess are institutional investors. In this market €200.000 would be a 
small size and €1.000.000 a typical size. The platform facilitates trading in approximately 
5000 bonds in Europe with about 250 trades a day. MarketAxess was developed as a 
computerized equivalent to the traditional telephone based system. Just like the telephone 
system it involves customers announcing their desired size and direction and asking dealers 
for quotes. Clients can request quotes from up to 6 dealers. Like on the telephone, the identity 
of the customer is revealed to the dealers. Consistent with models of repeated interaction, 
different customers might well get different prices for the same trade. The dealers contacted 
by the customer have 3 minutes to post prices, which remain firm for a small amount of time. 
The customer can take one of these offers by clicking on it. Thus, bond trading on 
MarketAxess works as a sequence of computerized first price auctions. This system enhances 
the efficiency of the market for the investors in two ways: First, it displays information on 
which dealers are interested in trading which bonds. This simplifies a lot the search problem 
of the investor. Second, by running an auction for the customers MarketAxess enhances their 
ability to let dealers compete with one another. 
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Notes 
                                                 
i Green, Hollifield and Shurhoff (2007) and Harris and Piwowar (2004) also offer very informative studies of the 
microstructure of the municipal bond market, which shares many features of the corporate bond market, such as 
OTC trading and dispersion of liquidity across many securities. 
ii Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003) studies institutional trades in corporate bonds over 1995-1997. They find an 
average bid-ask spread of the order of magnitude of 20 cents for a nominal bond price of $100. Edwards, Harris 
and Piwowar (2007) estimate that, for a retail order size of $ 20,000, the bid-ask spread is 138 cents. For trades 
of $ 200,000 their estimate of the average spread falls to 54 cents. 
iii At the July 2002 start of TRACE, post trade information was publicly disseminated for very large and high-
quality issues. For the other bonds, post-trade transparency was phased in later. 
iv This is likely to be one of the reasons underlying the remarkable development of the Credit Derivative Swaps 
market. Sellers of such swaps receive the yield spread as long as the issuer of the bond services its debt. They 
pay the buyers of the swap when the firm defaults. While, until recently, insurance companies, pension funds or 
UCITs generally could not trade CDS, dealers could. This facilitated their ability to trade risk and increased their 
risk management ability. 
v Retail investors or small institutional investors do not contact dealers directly. They trade through the 
intermediation of their bank or of brokers.  
vi ICMA defines itself as “the self-regulatory organisation and trade association representing the investment 
banks and securities firms issuing, trading and dealing in the international capital markets worldwide.” (See its 
website http://www.icma-group.org.) 
vii IIC first checks whether the quotes are non negative, whether the bid is lower than the ask quote, and whether 
the spread is blow 500 bp. To be included in the average, the quotes must pass these tests. Second, IIC checks if 
the difference between the maximum bid quote and the minimum bid quote is below a threshold. If it is not 
quotes are inspected further and outliers are eliminated. The same filter is applied on the ask side. 
viii This suggests that the quotes supplied by IIC, are meaningful prices.  
ix To illustrate, for a Euro denominated bond valued at €100, buyers would on average pay €100 and 5 cents to 
the dealers. And customers buying a bond valued at £100 would typically purchase it from dealers at £100 and 
10 pence. 
x This is the economic intuition underlying the theoretical corporate finance literature showing that debt contracts 
optimally mitigate adverse selection problems, see, e.g., Myers and Majluf (1984), DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) 
and Biais and Mariotti (2005). 
